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Introduction
The National-led government is currently considering a 
number of major policy initiatives that potentially have 
significant implications for sole parents, especially sole parents 
on benefit. These include changes to welfare following the 
Welfare Working Group’s (WWG) final report (WWG, 2011), 
and possible amendments to child support (see Dunne, 2010) 
and to early childhood education and care (ECEC) arising 
from the recommendations of the Early Childhood Education 
Task Force (which at the time of writing had not reported). 
Following the Christchurch earthquake on 22 February, the 
government has also indicated that it is considering tighter 
targeting of family tax credits.
This article does not attempt to make 
an assessment of these proposals and 
recommendations. Rather, its purpose is to 
set out some of the factors which will need 
to be taken into account by policy advisers 
and the government, and to highlight 
some underlying issues to be considered. 
Moreover, its focus is only on a subset of 
the policy questions – principally those 
relating to financial issues affecting sole 
parents whose youngest child is over three 
years of age, a group for whom the WWG 
proposes new or extended work search 
obligations. Important issues relating to 
parents with younger children and also to 
the group’s proposals regarding structural 
and delivery changes are not covered. 
Questions regarding benefit adequacy – 
which were outside the WWG’s terms of 
reference – are also not discussed.
Financial factors are focused on not 
just because of their obvious importance 
to the sole parent families concerned but 
because they are central to achieving the 
stated goal of promoting sole parents’ 
labour market participation. There is 
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evidence that work-testing alone has 
some impact on domestic purposes 
benefit (DPB) receipt (Wilson and Ball, 
2000; WWG, 2010), but its effect is 
likely to be muted (as well as potentially 
detrimental for the families) if not aligned 
with financial gains from increasing work 
hours that are large enough to increase 
income net of the costs of working.
The article is divided into two parts. 
The next section sets out some key 
features of the current situation and of 
some of the WWG’s proposed changes. 
This is followed by a discussion of four 
issues that arise from that analysis.
Current policy and some of the suggested 
changes
The returns to work for sole parents
Figure 1 presents the budget constraint for 
a sole parent with one child under 16 years 
of age. The data are graphed assuming 
the parent earns the minimum wage of 
$13.00 per hour. Tax, family tax credit and 
benefit rates and rules are those applying 
as at 1 April 2011.1 Accommodation 
assistance is not included as this varies 
greatly depending on location and tenure 
type (state housing or accommodation 
supplement (AS) for private costs). 
Where accommodation assistance would 
substantially affect the analysis, this is 
noted. Child care costs are presumed to be 
zero; ECEC costs are discussed below. The 
minimum wage is used first to show the 
‘base case’ for a sole parent on the lowest 
wage. Wage issues are discussed in the 
next section.
Several key points are evident from 
Figure 1. First, even at the minimum wage 
there is a sizeable increase in net income 
resulting from moving from zero hour’s 
employment on a benefit to full-time 
paid work. At 40 hours per week, the 
sole parent is $219.38 per week (or 58%) 
better off in net terms than if she/he was 
on a benefit with no paid work. Second, 
however, all but about $20 of that gain – 
$198.53 – results from the first 20 hours 
of work – the minimum number of 
hours for entitlement to the in work tax 
credit (IWTC) and the minimum family 
tax credit (MFTC) if off benefit. At the 
minimum wage rate there is no gain at 
all for additional paid work between 20 
hours and 38 hours. This is the result of 
the operation of the MFTC which ‘tops 
up’ the net wage to $427 per week but 
which is reduced dollar-for-dollar for 
additional earnings.3 
Third, the ‘dual abatement’ regime of 
a $100 per week ‘free zone’, followed by 30 
cents per dollar abatement on earnings 
between $100 and $200 dollars per week 
and 70 cents per dollar on earnings above 
that results in a relatively high return to 
work for part-time employment while on 
benefit. Sole-parent domestic purposes 
beneficiaries4 on the minimum wage 
have an increase in net income of $84.60 
from eight hours work and $136.00 from 
16 hours. The dual abatement regime was 
first introduced in 1995 as part of the 
then government’s response to the Prime 
Ministerial Task Force on Employment.5 
Its express purpose was to encourage 
labour market attachment through part-
time work for sole parents on benefit. 
Currently about one in six domestic 
purposes beneficiaries reports earnings 
to Work and Income.
A separate point to note is that 
Figure 1 does not take into account 
child support. Child support generally 
increases a custodial parent’s incentive 
to move off a benefit and into work, 
although by how much depends on the 
circumstances of the other parent. When 
the custodial parent is on a benefit all 
child support payments up to the value 
of the core benefit are retained by the 
Crown. If the custodial parent moves off 
a benefit (or if they re-partner and are on 
a couple benefit), child support payments 
are forwarded to them. How much is 
received depends on whether the paying 
parent is on a benefit and their income 
and family circumstances. Proposed 
amendments to the child support system 
are not discussed in this article but will 
need to be aligned with any amendments 
to welfare rules.
The importance of wage rates
Low wages are likely to represent a 
significant barrier for many sole-parent 
beneficiaries seeking to work full time. Of 
sole parents on the DPB, 88% are women, 
and 52% Mäori or Pacifica people. Median 
earnings for all waged women – across all 
levels of education and experience and 
in all regions – are $19.00 per hour.6 For 
Mäori and Pacifica women median wages 
are $17.00 and $16.88 respectively. Some 
48% of domestic purposes beneficiaries 
have no formal educational qualifications 
and a further 44% have no post-school 
qualifications (Ministry of Social 
Development, 2010). Median hourly 
earnings for people (men and women) 
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Figure 1: Budget constraint, sole parent with one child, minimum wage rate ($13/hr)
Notes: Includes benefit, income tax, family tax credits. Parent is assumed to be on benefit if working  between 0 and 19 hours 
and off-benefit at 20 or more hours work, when they become entitled to the in work tax credit and minimum family tax 
credit. Beneficiaries’ earnings from work are taxed at the secondary rate of 17.5%2. Child assumed to be less than 16 years 
of age. Accommodation assistance (AS or IRR) and ACC earner levy are not included. The inclusion of AS in these figures 
would have two effects: it would raise the amount received, but reduce the slope of the line at higher incomes (i.e. reduce 
gains from work) due to the 25% abatement of AS on earnings above $478pw. The situation is different again for state 
tenants on income-related rents, which rises with each dollar earned.
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with no qualifications are $16.00 and for 
those whose highest qualification is NCEA 
levels 1–3 (or their earlier equivalents) 
between $16.50 and $17.39. These figures 
are the median; many domestic purposes 
beneficiaries wanting to move into 
employment or increase their hours are 
likely to face wages below these levels.
Figure 2 shows the situation for the 
same sole-parent family but with different 
hourly wage rates, ranging from $13.00 
per hour up to $19.00 per hour. 
Two important features of the current 
system are evident in Figure 2. First, 
the current system – and specifically 
the MFTC – works to ensure a set level 
of income for low-paid sole parents 
working 20 hours per week. This is its 
basic objective. Second, the corollary is 
that the wage rate a sole parent is able to 
earn is crucial in their ability to escape 
the poverty trap created by the MFTC’s 
100% abatement and improve net family 
income by increasing their hours of 
work. Thirty hours per week is treated 
as full time by the benefit system7 and in 
official statistics. A sole parent does not 
receive any gain from moving from 20 to 
30 hours unless their wage rate is about 
$17.00 per hour (and then only $12.60 per 
week for the extra 10 hours work). 
Working a full 40-hour week rather 
than 20 hours, a sole parent gains $87pw 
for the extra 20 hours’ work if the wage rate 
is $15.00 per hour, $120pw if it is $16.00 
per hour and $153 if on $17.00 per hour. 
These figures are before the abatement of 
AS and assume no additional child care 
or transport costs (or other work-related 
costs). 
In summary, Figures 1 and 2 suggest 
that current policy settings encourage 
low-income sole parents to choose 
between one of four discrete labour 
supply choices:
• benefit receipt with no earned 
income;
• benefit receipt supplemented by 
income from a limited number of 
paid work hours;
• off-benefit and working 20 hours per 
week to gain the advantage of MFTC 
entitlement; or
• if they can achieve a wage rate of at 
least $16.00 or $17.00 per hour, full-
time work of around 40 hours per 
week.
Which of these options makes most 
sense for any particular sole parent will 
depend on their circumstances, including 
the number and ages of the children, 
travel-to-work and travel-to-care costs 
and time, and, crucially, early childhood 
education and care and out-of-school 
service costs. Options may also be 
affected by government policy introduced 
in September 2010 requiring domestic 
purposes beneficiaries whose youngest 
child is six or older to be available for and 
seek at least 15 hours paid work.
The Welfare Working Group’s proposals
The text of the WWG’s report makes clear 
that they are aware of most of the policy 
design issues discussed above. Their main 
recommendations relevant to the above 
are:
• that sole parents receiving welfare be 
required to seek at least 20 hours work 
per week once their youngest child is 
three years old and at least 30 hours 
per week once the youngest child is 
six (recommendation 5 b) i. (a) and 
(b));
• that abatement of Jobseeker Support 
(their proposed replacement for 
core benefits) be better aligned 
with paid work expectations and 
that consideration be given to an 
abatement-free zone that is as small 
as possible coupled with a single 
abatement rate designed to cut out 
at about 30 hours work at minimum 
wage for a single recipient; they 
suggest, as an example, a $20 per 
week an abatement-free zone and 55 
cent/dollar abatement rate (a 72.5% 
marginal tax rate for sole parents) 
(recommendation 20 d) ii and iii); 
and
• consideration be given to how the 
proposals will interact with Working 
for Families [i.e. family tax credits] 
and to ensuring the incentives for 
people to work 20 or more hours per 
week are increased (recommendation 
20 d) iv).
The WWG does not devote much time 
to interactions between the benefit system 
and tax credits. This is not surprising 
given that the ‘tax-benefit interface and 
Working for Families specifically’ were 
ruled out of the scope of their terms of 
reference, and it would be unfair to hold 
them to account on the detail of policy 
parameters put forward as examples. 
Nonetheless, these are issues policy 
makers will need to consider, and it is 
useful to draw out some implications. To 
this end Figure 3 uses the same one-child 
sole-parent family to compare the group’s 
abatement proposals with the current 
system. Minimum wages are assumed, as 
Note: assumptions and inclusions as for Figure 1.  
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Figure 2: Budget constraint, sole parent with one child, various wage rates
Note: assumptions and inclusions as for Figure 1.
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in Figure 1, but the choice of wage rate is 
not critical to the conclusions. 
Three points arise from Figure 3. 
First, and most obviously, the alternative 
steeper abatement regime has the effect 
of incentivising beneficiaries to work 20 
hours by reducing the gain from fewer 
hours. The EMTR on earnings above 
$20 per week up until moving off benefit 
rises to 72.5%. Assuming no behavioural 
response, the WWG’s suggestion would 
result in a considerable number of losers. 
Currently, approximately 15,800 domestic 
purposes beneficiaries (16%) and 44,400 
beneficiaries in total (12.6%) report 
some earnings to Work and Income.8 
These people would all have their benefit 
reduced by more than at present except 
for a small number reporting earnings of 
under $20 per week and those deemed 
to have very little capacity to work, for 
whom the WWG proposes a different, 
more generous abatement regime. At the 
same time, if the change were to have 
the intended effect of encouraging sole 
parents to move to 20 hours work it is 
not clear that the fiscal savings would be 
great, given that at low wage rates, total 
assistance (benefit plus tax credits less 
income tax) may be greater at 20 hours 
work off a benefit than at fewer working 
hours on an abated benefit.
Second, unless other changes were 
made, the combined proposals introduce 
an inconsistency between the proposed 
work expectation rules and the financial 
incentives. The WWG recommends that 
sole parents whose youngest child is six 
or older be required to seek at least 30 
hours work per week rather than the 
current 20 hours. However, based on 
the current MFTC, there is no financial 
gain at all from moving from 20 to 30 
hours work unless the person’s wage rate 
is above approximately $17.00 per hour. 
It seems anomalous to target full-time 
work in the work test and part-time 
work in family tax credits. Moreover, it 
is likely to be difficult to make full-time 
work search obligations effective when 
the financial incentives favour part-time 
work.
Third, Figure 3 is plotted on the 
basis of the current MFTC. In fact, 
however, if the MFTC was set according 
to existing rules, its level would need to 
be altered to ensure no one was worse 
off moving off a benefit at 30 hours for 
couples, or 20 hours for sole parents. 
The procedure for setting the MFTC 
is somewhat complex. The ‘worst case’ 
situation is found, which may or may 
not be at minimum wages and may be 
for either the sole parent working 20 
hours or couple working 30 hours. The 
necessary top-up is then applied to both 
family types. Even though the alternative 
abatement structure results in a higher 
gain for a sole parent moving off benefit 
at 20 hours, by my calculations it would 
be necessary to set the MFTC higher 
to accommodate the effect on couple 
families moving off benefit at 30 hours. 
The obvious policy design question 
this raises is whether there should be two 
MFTC top-up rates: one for those with 
a 20-hour work expectation and one for 
people (couples and sole parents with 
school-aged children) expected to seek 
full-time work. Such a scheme would 
have a number of other consequences. It 
would involve additional losers: namely, 
sole parents doing the ‘right thing’ 
by moving off a benefit and working 
between 20 and 29 hours. It would add 
complexity and it would require changes 
to the IWTC, which draws the same 
20-hour/30-hour distinction between 
sole parents and couples. At one level 
these are technical issues of detail, but 
on another they potentially have large 
implications for sole-parent families 
with low incomes and go to the heart 
of the objectives sought through these 
policies.
The impact of early childhood education 
and care costs9
So far the discussion has assumed zero 
child care costs, whereas in fact ECEC 
and out-of-school care costs can make a 
large difference to sole parents’ financial 
incentives to take work, especially full-
time work. 
ECEC is funded through three main 
instruments. These are:
• Ministry of Education funding (at 
variable rates) for all occupied places 
in licensed services;
• additional Ministry of Education 
funding through the 20 Hours ECE 
policy, which provides 20 hours ‘free’ 
or near-free10 ECE for 3 and 4 year 
olds in centres that have opted in to 
the programme; 
• Ministry of Social Development 
child care subsidy (CCS), paid at 
three rates dependent on family 
income and number of children for 
attendance at qualifying providers. 
The three rates are $3.77, $2.62 and 
$1.46 per child per hour. The CCS is 
available for up to 50 hours care per 
week for those in work or approved 
Notes: Assumptions as per Figure 1.
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Figure 3: Budget constraints, Welfare Working Group suggestions and current rules,  
sole parent with one child, minimum wage rate
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training. It cannot be claimed in 
respect of hours for which 20 Hours 
ECE is being paid.
Unfortunately, we do not have good 
data on the actual costs parents pay per 
hour for child care after accounting for 
the various subsidies.11 The Childcare 
Survey does provide some data on the 
amount paid per week, but there is no way 
of knowing how many hours of ECEC is 
being paid for. That survey showed that 
for all children attending formal care for 
at least part of the week (and excluding 
playgroups and Playcentre where a 
parent attends with the child), the cost 
to the parent was between $51 and $100 
per week for 20% of the children and 
over $100 for a further 23%. In addition, 
consumer price index data provided to 
the Early Childhood Education Task 
Force by the Ministry of Education 
show that fees fell by 34% on average 
immediately following the introduction 
of the 20 Hours ECE policy in mid-2007. 
A very rough check of websites suggests 
wide variation in costs for full-time, full-
day ECEC services, with an average of 
somewhere around $75+ per week for a 
3–4 year old entitled to 20 Hours ECE 
plus the maximum rate of CCS for the 
remaining hours. If this figure is about 
right, a sole parent with one 3–4-year-old 
child and earning $16.00 per hour would 
be only about $45 per week better off 
shifting from 20 hours to 40 hours paid 
work.12 
While the 20 Hours ECE policy clearly 
made ECEC more affordable, one key 
difficulty, well-recognised by the Welfare 
Working Group, is fitting the ECEC 
hours around work hours. Two issues 
face parents. The first is the additional 
time required to travel to and from the 
ECEC centre/provider and the workplace. 
The WWG suggests the Early Childhood 
Education Taskforce consider the benefits 
of extending the 20-hours provision to 25 
hours to accommodate this.
The second issue is the difficulty in 
matching Ministry of Education rules for 
use of the 20 Hours ECE with the hours 
structure provided by ECEC services 
and with the hours of the job. The 
ministry funds a maximum of six hours 
per day under 20 Hours ECE, whereas 
most ECEC centres offer only full-day 
or half-day options. There is a logic 
behind both arrangements: the ministry 
is modelling its policy on education 
delivery in primary schools and what is 
best for young children’s learning; ECEC 
providers are driven by the practical and 
financial imperatives of running a centre. 
As a result, though, there are limited work 
patterns that permit a sole parent to move 
off benefit by working 20 hours without 
incurring at least some ECEC costs 
outside the 20 Hours ECE provisions. 
Five mornings or five afternoons per 
week might work, depending on travel 
times, but most other arrangements, such 
as two and a half days per week, do not. 
A sole parent who has a pre-schooler plus 
an older child at school and who wants 
to fit 20 hours paid work around school 
hours is likely to have to pay for five days 
full-time ECEC. 
Discussion: some underlying issues
The above discussion of policy design 
details brings out some of the more basic 
issues policy makers will need to consider 
when implementing changes. In part 
these are about the objectives policies are 
seeking to achieve, and in part they relate 
to integrating policies across objectives 
that may in places conflict or compete with 
each other. The discussion below covers 
only four of these issues. As mentioned 
in the introduction, the range of issues 
included in the remit of the WWG and 
other review committees and the scope 
of changes currently under consideration 
include many other significant matters.
How important is the ‘on-benefit’/‘off-benefit’ 
distinction?
A first point is how much significance 
should be attached to the distinction 
between being ‘on-benefit’ and ‘off-
benefit’. The WWG clearly sees moving 
people off a benefit as very important. 
This is perhaps not surprising for a 
committee charged with advising on 
ways of ‘reducing long-term benefit 
dependence’. However, it is important to 
be clear what that term means and why it is 
considered a desirable outcome, if indeed 
it is. If ‘benefit dependence’ is measured 
by the amount of direct cash assistance 
received (less income tax paid), then a sole 
parent off-benefit and working 20 hours 
per week on minimum wages would 
under the WWG’s abatement suggestions 
be more ‘dependent’ than if she/he were 
working nine hours and receiving an 
abated benefit.13 
Usually the term is used to refer to 
receipt of core benefits, yet nearly all sole 
parents (and many other beneficiaries) 
moving off a benefit would continue 
to be entitled to second-tier benefits, 
most commonly the accommodation 
supplement and child care or OSCAR 
Subsidy. In other words, if the objective 
of reducing benefit dependence is to 
detach people from contact with the 
welfare system, then simply shifting 
people off a benefit at 20 hours per week 
does not succeed as they continue to be 
clients of Work and Income. The WWG 
appears to be aware of this and suggests 
consideration be given to delivery of 
second-tier assistance through the tax 
system in the same way that family tax 
credits are delivered. This has some 
potential advantages, including the fact 
that it is likely to result in more complete 
take-up of entitlements, but may also 
lead to more debt due to innocent 
overpayment problems.
Another consequence of an ‘off-
benefit’ focus is that it leads to the type of 
sharp abatement regime discussed above, 
where any labour force attachment below 
20 hours per week is strongly discouraged. 
While the 20 Hours ECE policy clearly made ECEC 
more affordable, one key difficulty, well-recognised 
by the Welfare Working Group, is fitting the ECEC 
hours around work hours.
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Is it better for a sole parent to work zero 
hours in paid work until she/he is in a 
position to shift to 20 hours per week 
than it is for her/him to work, say, 10 or 12 
hours before later shifting to 20 or more? 
In part one’s view on the on-benefit/off-
benefit question depends on whether one 
believes contact with the benefit system is 
in some way corrosive or stultifying. The 
WWG report is clear in its concern to 
avoid situations where sole parents and 
other beneficiaries adapt to a low-income 
life where all or nearly all their income 
derives from benefits and tax credits. It is 
less clear, though, that the only positive 
alternative is 20 or more hours work and 
no core benefit.
Full-time versus part-time employment
The WWG is clear in wanting policy set-
tings to encourage and expect sole parents 
to work full time once their youngest child 
is school-aged. One rationale it gives for 
this is that increasingly women, and spe-
cifically partnered mothers, are choosing 
full-time employment and the welfare sys-
tem should be aligned with these prefer-
ences. However, the logic of this argument 
is open to question: couples where both 
parents work full time still have twice the 
number of non-paid work hours available 
to run the home and manage child-rear-
ing and child care responsibilities. This 
includes greater opportunities to manage 
the day-to-day balance between paid work 
and care, such as morning start times, af-
ter-school care, school holidays and time 
off when children are sick.
Moreover, the data are less compelling 
than a reading of the group’s report 
might imply. I do not have figures on 
both parents’ combined paid work 
hours for couple families by age of child. 
However, figures on partnered mothers’ 
employment rates suggest most couples 
with pre-secondary-aged children do 
not both work full time. Looking at 2006 
Census data for partnered mothers who 
are aged 20–54 and who have no post-
school qualifications (i.e. a group similar 
to sole parents on a benefit), only 40% 
whose youngest child was aged 5–9 years 
worked full time compared with 35% 
who work part time (defined as between 
one and 29 hours per week). For those 
whose youngest was aged 10–17 years the 
full-time employment rate was just over 
a half (see Table 1). Allowing for the fact 
that in a number of cases the mother 
would have been the only earner in the 
family, the proportion of such families 
where both have full-time paid work 
would be lower still. 
Wage rates and education and training
Figure 2 makes clear how critical the 
wage rate a sole parent can earn is in 
determining her/his ability to improve on 
the modest level of income guaranteed by 
the MFTC. However, prevailing wage rates 
for women who have few qualifications 
and limited labour market experience – 
who comprise the majority of sole-parent 
beneficiaries – are low. Durable strategies 
to allow sole parents to earn a greater 
proportion of their family’s income and to 
reduce the amount paid in state assistance 
must surely include ways of raising sole 
parents’ wages when in employment. 
Increases in statutory minimum wages 
and other regulatory support to raise low 
wages are part of this. 
Also important are the education 
and training opportunities available to 
sole parents. The WWG recommends 
incentives for employers to provide 
more on-the-job and NZQA-approved 
vocational training. (It is not clear, 
though, what the report means by 
employer incentives ‘such as through 
tiered training wages’. Lower training 
wages will not work if the constraint is 
the sole parent’s income rather than the 
cost to the employer.) 
The report also acknowledges the 
value of sole parents undertaking 
tertiary study. However, the group’s 
recommendation on this needs more 
work. They note the disincentive effects 
of the higher level of housing assistance 
available to sole parents on benefit (or 
in work) through the accommodation 
supplement compared with what is 
payable in accommodation benefit if 
they are tertiary students supported 
through StudyLink. They recommend 
that these effects be addressed ‘to enable 
[sole parents] to move out of the welfare 
system and undertake tertiary study 
through the student support system’ 
(recommendation 16). 
Anomalies between the accommoda-
tion benefit for students and the 
accommodation supplement for bene-
ficiaries and low-income workers are a 
long-standing and complex problem. 
My understanding of the current system 
is that sole parents on a benefit can 
sometimes continue to receive their 
benefit and accommodation supplement 
and also receive student assistance for 
fees and course-related costs but only 
where Work and Income deems the 
course to be part of a return-to-work 
plan. In general this would be for shorter 
courses and be unlikely to include multi-
year tertiary education. One way of 
resolving the problem is to allow sole 
parents on a benefit to access assistance 
for fees and course costs for university 
and other tertiary study while retaining 
their benefit and accommodation 
supplement. The other is to transfer them 
to a student allowance (at the same rate 
as the DPB but with different abatement/
earnings rules) but allow them to access 
an accommodation supplement. Both 
options would cost extra, but would 
provide recipients with the opportunity 
to raise their earning power to levels that 
Table 1: Full- and part-time employment rates, partnered mothers, by age of youngest child
Full time (%) Part time (%)
Total 
employment rate
Youngest child aged 5–9 years
No post-school qualifications 40.2 34.9 75.1
All qualification groups 42.8 33.7 76.5
Youngest child aged 10–17 years
No post-school qualifications 52.4 28.4 80.8
All qualification groups 55.3 26.9 82.2
Source: Ministry of Women’s Affairs (2009), 2006 Census data.
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would significantly reduce their likelihood 
of being long-term benefit recipients in 
the future. Which is preferable goes back 
to the question of whether it matters if a 
person is deemed ‘benefit dependent’ in 
the Work and Income system (as against 
being a student in the StudyLink system). 
The flow-on effects for other groups 
of students currently only entitled to 
accommodation benefit would also need 
to be addressed. 
Supporting sole parents to balance paid work 
and care responsibilities
The above discussion of ECEC services 
concentrated on the impact of child care 
costs. However there are two other issues 
policy makers will need to address.
The first is implications of work-
search obligations for sole parents. In 
order to enforce work obligations and 
to require sole parents to take jobs that 
are offered to them, Work and Income 
(or any other employment agency) needs 
to be able to resolve the sole parent’s 
child care needs. Clearly, where financial 
incentives to work are good this will be 
less of a problem, but where they are not 
the sole parent will be less willing to take 
work. Ultimately, to enforce obligations 
the agency needs to be able to say ‘here 
is a place in a safe, approved childcare 
service that is suitable for your child – 
you are required to take the job offer and 
either use this child care place or find 
your own alternative’. The other option 
of offering x dollars per week for a sole 
parent to pay a relative or friend to care 
for her/his child will not work for work-
test purposes for the obvious reason that 
the sole parent can always say she/he has 
no one who is willing to provide the care. 
In effect, Work and Income will need to 
buy a supply of child care (and OSCAR) 
places across the country to be used to 
enforce work-test obligations.14
A second issue relates to the 
relationship between early childhood 
education, formal child care and 
informal care provided by family, friends 
or paid informal carers. Many parents 
use informal care, either because it is 
convenient or because it allows contact 
between grandparents or other family 
members and their children. For many 
it is an important part of family life 
and the upbringing they want for their 
children. For policy makers focused on 
sole parents’ labour force participation 
(albeit also concerned more broadly with 
children’s well-being), the central question 
is whether the state should financially 
support such care. On the one hand, the 
deadweight costs would be high; on the 
other, care provided by others, especially 
grandparents, is an important factor in 
allowing sole parents to take work and 
move off a benefit.
Within the formal sector there is 
a long-standing tension between the 
provision of child care for parental 
labour supply purposes and the provision 
of ECE for child development and 
education purposes.15 The 20 Hours ECE 
policy can be seen as a useful building 
block towards reducing this tension. 
By universalising near-free education 
(on a voluntary basis) from age three it 
makes part-time parental employment 
more achievable once the youngest child 
reaches that age. The WWG’s proposal 
to extend it to 25 hours would help align 
it with 20 hours paid work, although 
logic suggests moving towards a 9am–
2.30pm or 3.00pm structure aligned with 
school hours, coupled with a ‘care and 
recreation’ focus outside those hours to 
accommodate parents working longer or 
different hours.
A final observation about measures 
to support sole parents to balance caring 
with paid work is about the role of the 
employer. With (usually) only one adult 
to manage the occasional and often 
unpredictable problems that arise – 
children’s illnesses, doctors and other 
appointments, school events, school 
holidays and so on – a sole parent’s 
ability to sustain her employment is often 
dependent on her employer’s flexibility 
and co-operation. There is potentially 
value in ongoing government-subsidised 
support for additional leave for sole 
parents whose employment arrangements 
would otherwise break down. 
Conclusion
The WWG has put forward an argument 
and proposals for a strongly ‘work-
focused’ welfare system. The purpose of 
this article is to draw out some of the issues 
of integrating this approach with other 
policies affecting the financial implications 
for sole parents moving off benefit and into 
work. Imposing stronger work obligations 
on sole parent beneficiaries may have 
some effect on the numbers recorded on 
benefit. However, the effect is likely to be 
limited and the risks of negative impacts 
on the sole-parent families themselves 
high unless work obligations are coupled 
with a package of policies that make it 
practical and financially beneficial for sole 
parents to balance paid work and caring 
responsibilities. This includes policies 
to raise sole parents’ wages, coherent 
integration of benefits, tax credits and 
abatement regimes and extended ECEC 
provision. 
1 The ACC earner levy has also not been included, but this 
does not substantially alter the analysis. Benefit rates and 
rules are available at http://www.workandincome.govt.nz/
manuals-and-procedures.html.
2 Unless there are exceptional circumstances, all beneficiaries’ 
earnings are taxed at secondary rates. In the case of sole 
parents who are on benefit full-year, this is also likely to be 
the ‘right’ end-of-year tax rate, as their gross benefit exceeds 
the $14,000 lowest tax threshold. There will be some 
situations of part-year benefit receipt however where the final 
annual tax payable is different.
3 This MFTC rate applies from 1 April 2011; for the year 
prior the amount was $408pw. Note that for many people 
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effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) would be high (62.5% 
to 75% in most cases) even in the absence of the MFTC 
because of the 20% abatement of family tax credits on 
earnings above $708.21pw ($36,827pa) and 25% on AS 
on earnings above $478pw on top of income tax. Third-tier 
assistance such as temporary assistance grants can also 
raise EMTRs.
4 Some other groups also have the same abatement regime. 
The abatement regime for unemployment benefit is 70 cents 
per dollar earned over $80 per week.
5 Although until last year the thresholds were set at $80.00 
and $180pw.
6 June 2010 New Zealand Income Survey.
7 The full-time work test refers to 30 hours or more per week 
and persons working 30 hours or more cannot register as 
unemployed. 
8 Ministry of Social Development Benefit Factsheet, December 
2010. 
9 At the time of writing the Early Childhood Education Task 
Force had not reported. It is likely that its recommendations 
will address issues of cost.
10 Centres may charge for certain items and activities.
11 Although it is possible that the Early Childhood Education 
Task Force may be able to obtain estimates as part of its 
work, none are available at time of writing. 
12 This also assumes that child care costs for the first 20 
hours	are	covered	by	the	20	Hours	ECE	provisions.	If	not,	
net income after child care is lower at 20 hours but the gap 
between 20 and 40 hours is correspondingly larger.
13 Assuming the current MFTC.
14 The alternative, for the state to have no consideration for 
the child’s care arrangements, would (I assume) be socially 
unacceptable and would in any case run counter to the legal 
requirement for parents and guardians to ensure adequate 
care.
15 See Baker (2011) for a discussion of these issues in relation 
to New Zealand and Canada.
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Wouter Van Dooren, a highly respected 
international academic, suggested that 
“politicians don’t use performance 
information; citizens don’t understand it and 
don’t bother with it; and public managers 
don’t trust it or don’t take it seriously”. 
A former New Zealand Controller and 
Auditor-General, Kevin Brady, has described 
the quality of non-financial performance 
information produced by public sector 
agencies in New Zealand in highly derogatory 
terms.  In a similar vein  a former Cabinet 
minister observed that “no one in their 
right mind” would rely on New Zealand 
government management reporting.
This book explores the results of a major 
three-year research project by a team of 
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the New Zealand state sector actively use 
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all levels of executive government actively 
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purposes, rather than solely as an exercise 
in compliance (which in part it is). What 
emerged within public agencies was the 
picture of an iron cage of control based on 
performance measurement. This was not 
how the designers of the formal system 
envisaged performance information would be 
used. The book concludes with proposals for 
the ongoing development of organisational 
performance management in  
New Zealand.
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